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Northwestern President
Walter Dill Scott called it "the most important problem ever presented
to the Board of Trustees."
The problem to which
he referred was the proposal in 1933 by Robert Maynard Hutchins,
president of the University of Chicago, to merge the two institutions.
In the interests of
secrecy, Scott formed a committee --originally designated the
Special Committee on an Important Problem -- to thoroughly investigate
and debate the matter, digging to the depths of Northwestern's
soul.
In a memo accompanying
his letter, Hutchins based the radical proposal on several assumptions,
two being that the Depression would make it difficult to secure
new money for education at the time and the operation of the two
universities as one would create the greatest educational enterprise
in the world.
The two presidents
drafted an outline for the benefit of the merger committee, proposing
a three-campus system with graduate work based in Hyde Park, undergraduate
training in Evanston and professional education on Northwestern's
Chicago campus. Scott and Hutchins sought a plan that would avoid
duplications in educational administration and curriculum and
thereby save money.
In the summer of 1933,
Northwestern's merger team met with its counterpart at the University
of Chicago. The two bodies framed the problem with four fundamental
questions about the merger: Was it educationally desirable? Was
it economically desirable? Could it be entered into legally without
affecting Northwestern's tax-exempt status under its charter?
And, was the mutual goodwill and competence of the two boards
of trustees sufficiently strong to assure the plan's success?
As the debate spilled
into the late fall, Northwestern opened the matter to a group
of alumni and faculty. The faculty wing took up the task of determining
the educational advantages and disadvantages of the merger on
each of the schools within the University.
Inevitably, the behind-the-scenes
ruminations spawned rumors regarding the motives of the proposal.
Some alleged that the prime objective was to permit the University
of Chicago to share Northwestern's tax-exempt status.
When the story hit
the local press, it took on an added dimension. An anonymous author
wrote in the Evanston Review of Jan. 18, 1934, that a $25 million
endowment would become available from the Rockefeller Foundation
on the condition there be only one university in the Chicago area.
The Evanston City Council
and Chamber of Commerce asserted their opposition to the merger
on the grounds that it would, as one business representative said,
"deal a staggering blow to Evanston" through a decline in the
volume of trade and a reduction of real estate values.
Not long after, opposition
within the Northwestern community began to swell. Alumni feared
the loss of traditional associations and loyalties, as well as
the Northwestern name itself -- an early proposal called for the
name The Universities of Chicago.
The strongest criticism
of the move came from the Medical School. The objections of faculty
and students were based mostly on differing educational philosophies.
While University of Chicago medical faculty engaged largely in
the research and teaching of theoretical aspects of medicine,
Northwestern aimed to teach its students applied medicine. The
faculty body echoed the displeasure of the students who at a mass
rally burned the effigies of Scott and Hutchins.
It is thought that
the death of Melvin A. Traylor, merger committee chair and Scott
ally, signaled lost hope for the venture. Scott eventually concluded
that the plans be scrapped as it was unlikely the board would
vote for the merger. Hutchins agreed, and the deal died Feb. 25,
1934, when trustees from Northwestern and the University of Chicago
voted to set aside the plans and discharge the committees.
Both presidents revealed
their deep disappointment over the proposal's failure. Hutchins
called it "one of the lost opportunities of American education."
Within weeks of the
final vote, Scott wrote a letter to a board member. "The more
I studied the merger, the more desirable I found it to be," he
wrote. "It is a great regret to me that conditions were such that
it could not become a reality. In my judgment the merger will
become a reality at some future date.
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